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Abstract
In this article I propose that the role of  law in Karl Polanyi’s concept of  the “always embedded economy”1
can be enriched by the application of  the “lens of  community” 2 developed by Roger Cotterrell.3 I begin with
Polanyi’s suggestion that economic action and interaction are always “embedded” in wider social life. Reading
through the lens of  community, we can be more specific: any actor is at once engaged, to different degrees
(from fleeting to stable), in multiple types (whether focusing on instrumental, traditional, affective and/or
belief-based action) of  social life. I then explore a second, implicit, cornerstone of  Polanyi’s argument: that
analytical and normative approaches to economy may become disembedded from wider social life. Reading
through the lens of  community we can again be more specific: in the transformation to a market society, the
analytical and normative approaches that are central to economic actions and interactions are confused with,
and privileged over, those that are central to non-economic actions and interactions. This confusion and
privileging can have what we might call a performative effect on action and interaction. Finally, I explore
Polanyi’s story of  law as a facilitator both of  disembedding movements and of  re-embedding counter-
movements. The application of  a law-and-community lens suggests some additional details of  that storyline
and that there are additional plotlines to be pursued. The practical potential of  this Polanyi-meets-Cotterrell
economic sociology of  law is briefly illustrated with references to two twenty-first-century cautionary tales: the
World Bank’s investment climate programme and the 2008 financial crisis.
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Introduction
The Great Transformation is among the most-rifled of  academic works. The theme ofembeddedness that weaves through the book, albeit often unnamed,4 has been a rich
source of  inspiration for sociologists, political scientists and heterodox economists, and,
more recently, legal scholars.5 Karl Polanyi’s key contention with respect to embeddedness
is that, during the transformative period of  the Industrial Revolution, “market liberals
wanted to embed society in the autonomous economy, but their project could not succeed”
for two reasons: economies are always in fact embedded in society, and “market economies
are dependent upon the state to manage the supply and demand for the fictitious
commodities” of  land, labour and money.6
One reason why the “concept of  the always embedded economy”7 has such broad
appeal is that it has implications across four social levels: the “micro” level of  individual
actors and their actions; the “meso” level of  interactions between actors; the “macro” level at
which those interactions aggregate into the institutions of  social regimes; and the meta-level
of  rationalities – “the basic principles” which underlie and direct social regimes.8 Put in these
terms, Polanyi’s own analysis of  embeddedness can be said to have focused on how our
meta-level thinking and our macro-level policies in respect of  economy were first
disembedded from wider social life in the course of  the Industrial Revolution and then 
re-embedded in wider social life through regulatory counter-movements.
The naturalisation of  once-radical theories often involves awkward estrangements, so it
is perhaps unsurprising that some putative “Polanyians” have stretched the fabric of  his
conceptual framework and muted the colour of  his moral outrage. Polanyi laid his
normative cards flat out on the table, as the following passage demonstrates:
[N]othing saved the common people of  England from the impact of  the
Industrial Revolution. A blind faith in spontaneous progress had taken hold of
people’s minds, and with the fanaticism of  sectarians the most enlightened
pressed forward for boundless and unregulated change in society. The effects on
the lives of  people were awful beyond description. Indeed, human society would
have been annihilated but for protective counter-moves which blunted the action
of  this self-destructive mechanism.9
By contrast, the economic sociologists for whom his work is a touchstone have often
refused to make “normative conclusions about the subject-matter at issue”.10 For example,
Richard Swedberg based his case for an economic sociology of  law in part on the need to
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4 Fred Block has argued that: “Polanyi glimpsed the idea of  the always embedded market economy, but he
was not able to give that idea a name or develop it theoretically because it represented too great a divergence
from his initial theoretical starting point.” Block, “Karl Polanyi”, n. 1 above, p. 277. However, Gareth Dale
has pointed out that, although Polanyi uses the term embeddedness only a few times in The Great
Transformation, references to it “crop up repeatedly in his published books and articles from the post-war
period, and even more frequently in his unpublished notes and manuscripts”. G Dale, “Lineages of
embeddedness: on the antecedents and successors of  a Polanyian concept” (2011) 70 American Journal of
Economics and Sociology 307, p. 320.
5 See C Joerges and J Falke (eds), Karl Polanyi, Globalisation and the Potential of  Law in Transnational Markets
(Oxford: Hart Publishing 2011).
6 Block, “Karl Polanyi”, n. 1 above, p. 279 (original emphasis).
7 Ibid.
8 S Frerichs, “Re-embedding neo-liberal constitutionalism: a Polanyian case for the economic sociology of  law”
in Joerges and Falke, Karl Polanyi, n. 5 above, p. 68.
9 K Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The political and economic origins of  our time (Boston: Beacon Press 2001 [1944]), p. 79.
10 Frerichs, “Re-embedding neo-liberal constitutionalism”, n. 8 above, pp. 68, 69. See also Dale, “Lineages of
embeddedness”, n. 4 above, pp. 325–9.
provide a neutral alternative to the “explicitly normative” economic approach to law.11
Sabine Frerichs has responded with a call for an economic sociology of  law that is truer to
the letter and the spirit of  The Great Transformation –“Polanyi-inspired” economic sociology
of  law, through which his deft analytical touch and forceful normative spirit could be
coherently extended from the meta level of  rationalities down to the micro level of  action.
In this article I propose that such an exploration of  the role of  law in the “always embedded
economy” can be enriched by the application of  the lens of  community12 developed by
Roger Cotterrell.13
I begin with Polanyi’s suggestion that economic action and interaction are always
“embedded” in wider social life. Reading through the lens of  community, we can be more
specific: any actor is at once engaged, to different degrees (from fleeting to stable), in
multiple types (whether focusing on instrumental, traditional, affective and/or belief-based
action) of  social life. I then explore a second, implicit, cornerstone of  Polanyi’s argument:
that analytical and normative approaches to economy may become disembedded from wider
social life. Reading through the lens of  community we can again be more specific: in the
transformation to a market society, the analytical and normative approaches that are central
to economic actions and interactions (including economic networks of  community) are
confused with, and privileged over, the analytical and normative approaches that are central
to other actions and interactions (including non-economic networks of  community). This
confusion and privileging can have what we might call a performative effect at the levels of
action and interaction. Finally, I explore Polanyi’s story of  law as a feature of  the always-
embedded economy, and as a facilitator both of  disembedding movements and of  re-
embedding counter-movements. The community lens adds detail to that story, and suggests
additional plotlines to be pursued. The practical potential of  this Polanyi-meets-Cotterrell
economic sociology of  law is briefly illustrated with references to two twenty-first-century
cautionary tales: the World Bank’s investment climate programme and the 2008 financial
crisis. In light of  its presence in a special issue devoted to Polanyi, this piece assumes a
degree of  familiarity with his work.14
Embedded economic action and interaction
Economic action and interaction are always embedded in wider social life. Polanyi made this
point tangentially when he implied that what we choose to call “labour”, a key “element of
industry”,15 is in fact comprised of  people engaged in just one of  the many forms of  social
relations that are the stuff  of  their everyday lives. This observation is enriched in two ways
by the application of  a community lens.
First, we see that economy is always embedded because all actors are engaged in diverse
types of  social action. Cotterrell’s community approach is grounded in Max Weber’s
categorisation of  four ideal types of  social action (traditional, instrumental, belief-based and
affective) of  which economic action and interaction are just one (instrumental) sub-type. So
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11 R Swedberg, “The case for an economic sociology of  law” (2003) 32 Theory and Society 1, pp. 1–2. This
description would be met with discomfort, even indignation, by many economists, since economics is typically
presented as a neutral technology untainted by politics. Of  course, that is a fantasy that authors such as
Jonathan Aldred have dispensed with in detail: J Aldred, The Skeptical Economist: Revealing the ethics inside economics
(London: Earthscan 2009).
12 Perry-Kessaris, Global Business, Local Law, n. 2 above. 
13 Cotterrell, Law’s Community, “Seeking similarity” and  “Community as a legal concept?”, all n. 3 above.
14 In addition to reading The Great Transformation itself, a varied introduction to Polanyi’s work can be gained from
reading G Krippner et al., “Polanyi symposium: a conversation on embeddedness” (2004) 2 Socio-Economic
Review 109; Block, “Karl Polanyi”, n. 1 above; and Dale, “Lineages of  embeddedness”, n. 4 above.
15 Polanyi, The Great Transformation, n. 9 above, pp. 75–6.
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we are reminded that any actor is at once embedded, or engaged in, multiple types of  social
action – instrumental activities such as commerce, affective interactions between friends
and family, traditional interactions founded across the generations, and interactions
grounded in belief.
Second, the notion of  “community” allows us to distinguish, in a way that is
meaningful in the context of  a globalising world, between different degrees of
embeddedness. Each type of  social life can occur in patterns ranging from superficially
embedded individual actions, to fleeting interactions between strangers, to relatively stable,
deeply embedded, networks of  community – whether confined to single neighbourhoods
or stretching across the globe. “Networks of  community” are primarily a unit of  analysis
– a way of  highlighting those social interactions that “have some stability and moral
meaning” whenever, wherever and however they take place. Our attention is drawn not “to
distinct social groups” but “to the degree of  development of  certain aspects of  social
relationships”16 – specifically: stable interactions and a sense of  belonging. Relations of
community can potentially exist wherever interactions (objectively) exist that are relatively
“stable and sustained”. When these interactions are accompanied by (subjective) feelings
of  “attachment or belonging to others or to something beyond the individual”, then they
can be regarded as relations of  community.17 This sense of  belonging is grounded in a
mutually reinforcing combination of, on the one hand, trust and, on the other hand, shared
values and interests. Because trust is vital to all types of  stable, productive social
interactions it serves as a reference point for an integrated analysis across multiple types of
social action and relations, economic and non-economic.
Mention of  the term “community” tends to generate a number of  frequently asked
questions. Here I will limit myself  to answering two, and strictly from the perspective of
Cotterrell’s approach. First, no, the application of  a community lens is not intended to
privilege relations of  community over the individual, but a sense of  community is valuable
in that “social life in any stable and rewarding sense is impossible without it”.18 Second, yes,
relations of  community, like all relations, involve power, and can be brutal and unpleasant.
So, there is nothing inherently warm and fuzzy about networks of  community.19
Disembedded economic rationalities and regimes
The preceding section established that any actor, including their actions and interactions, is
simultaneously embedded, to different degrees, in multiple types of  social life. We now move to consider
embeddedness at the macro/meta levels of  rationalities and regime. To the extent “that they
are moral, scientific or cultural constructions”, economies are also “always embedded” in
wider society at the meta and macro levels.20 In that sense it is as inaccurate to speak of
“economy and society” as it is to speak of  “law and society” – neither law nor economy can
exist without society. If  economic life is always embedded in all levels of  social life, how,
why and when does Polanyi’s disembededdness occur? Sabine Frerichs does much to unravel
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 62(4)
16 Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society, n. 3 above, p. 73.
17 Ibid. p. 70.
18 Ibid. pp. 162–3.
19 See, for example, ibid. p. 68.
20 Frerichs, “Re-embedding Neo-liberal Constitutionalism”, n. 8 above, p. 70.
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this conundrum when she explains that embeddedness can also be thought of  in terms of
the relative “ranking” of  “different principles of  social organisation”.21
I will continue my habit of  speaking of  these “principles of  social organisation” as, on
the one hand, the “analytical approaches” by which we organise social life into concepts and
relationships; and, on the other hand, the “normative approaches” by which we organise the
values and interests at the core of  social life.22 For those who might wish to place them in
the context of  the social levels identified at the outset, we can say that these approaches
form the intersection between the meta and the macro levels: analytical approaches are
manifestations of  rationalities, normative approaches are implemented in the form of
regimes. Analytical embeddedness:23
is, first of  all, about how Economy and Society are defined and counterposed,
while normative embeddedness is about the institutional relations that
interconnect and integrate these (conceptually separated) entities . . . [B]oth can,
and, indeed, do, change over time, and it is precisely this which is then perceived
as a state of  crisis.24
So, Polanyi’s disembeddedness is associated with the dominance of  rationalities and
regimes that rank liberal, economic above other approaches. An analytically disembedded
approach is one that thinks of  society as economy; which uses liberal economic concepts and
relationships to think not only about economic and other instrumental actions, but also
about affective, belief-based and traditional actions. A normatively disembedded approach
is one that both puts economy before society and takes economy for society. It produces regimes
which privilege economic values and interests, usually claiming this to be for the good of  all
types of  social action, including other instrumental action, and also affective, belief-based
and traditional actions. Rephrased in these terms, Polanyi’s outrage was directed to the fact
that during the Industrial Revolution approaches to thinking (analytical) and deciding
(normative) about social, including economic, action were allowed and encouraged to float
free from their proper bed in the broader social sciences. A narrower, liberal–economic
approach dominated thinking and practice, even while real social, including economic,
action and interaction had remained embedded in the complex diversity of  wider social life.
The phenomenon of  “economics imperialism” that preceded, facilitated and still serves
to consolidate the transformation to a market society is well-documented. For example, Ben
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21 Frerichs, “Re-embedding Neo-liberal Constitutionalism”, n. 8 above, p. 78. Kurtulu Gemici made a
superficially similar, but fundamentally different, distinction when he described Polanyi as setting two
functions for disembeddedness: disembeddedness as a “methodological principle” and as a “historical
variable”. Gemici agreed with Granovetter’s observations made elsewhere that only the methodological
version of  embeddedness is of  any use, and that use is limited because it “falls short of  providing a theoretical
alternative to mainstream economics”. Both of  these propositions deserve critical attention. First, that
embeddedness does not offer an alternative to mainstream economics is true. But that need not – and, we can
surmise, would not for Polanyi – necessarily be perceived as a failing. The aspirations of  mainstream economic
theory are surely much grander – in flamboyant scope and in intrusive detail – than were Polanyi’s. He was
not seeking to predict, explain and measure all aspects of  social life as instrumental actions, as do mainstream
economists, but rather to understand the impacts of  market-oriented regimes on human life. Second, the
notion of  embeddedness as “historical variable” is, in fact, also useful – at least for those interested in an
economic sociology of  law. However, that utility is better realised when we specify that this “historical
variable” relates to the extent to which, at any given time, the dominant normative approach is more or less
market-oriented, that is, more or less disembedded from wider social life, producing regimes which privilege,
to a greater or lesser extent, economic values and interests. K Gemici, “Karl Polanyi and the antinomies of
embeddedness” (2008) 6 Socio-Economic Review 5, pp. 22–26.
22 See A Perry-Kessaris, “Prepare your indicators: economics imperialism on the shores of  law and
development” (forthcoming 2011) International Journal of  Law in Context.
23 Frerichs uses the term “conceptual embeddedness” for what I am calling “analytical embeddedness”.
24 Frerichs, “Re-embedding neo-liberal constitutionalism”, n. 8 above, p. 70.
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Fine and Dimitris Milonakis have tracked the evolution of  economics as a system of
thought from inseparable playfellow of  other social sciences at the time of  Adam Smith’s
The Wealth of  Nations in 1776, to its current position as the hollowed out – narrow, asocial,
disembedded – coloniser of  those social sciences.25 Each aspect of  social life in which
economics is successfully naturalised risks becoming analytically and normatively
disembedded from wider social life. 
Economists are not alone in extending the application of  their analytical frameworks to
the point of  unreality – “analysing one  . . . aspect of  social relations abstracted from its
broader social context . . . taking that part for the whole” and “applying analyses based on
such abstractions to all aspects of  human activity and social life”.26 While an empire-
building economist “starts from the view that [the] primary concern is the analysis of
exchange or ‘markets’, and elevates this into a theory of  human history and society based
on individual choice”; an empire-building lawyer “views state law as a system of  fixed and
determinable rules, and assumes that they are instruments which directly and immediately
govern all social behaviour”.27 Elsewhere, new economic sociology pioneer Mark
Granovetter has noted the tendency of  some sociologists to tell “over socialised” tales.28
But nothing matches the imperial success of  economics.
Economics derives much of  its drive from the three assumptions “used relentlessly and
unflinchingly” that form its analytical “heart”: that individuals always seek to “maximise”
their utility, profit and so on; that markets “with varying degrees of  efficiency coordinate
the actions of  different participants – individuals, firms, even nations – so that their
behaviour becomes mutually consistent”; and that actors (individuals, firms, states and so
on) have stable preferences.29 Although the “boundaries of  these assumptions” have been
“challenged” by new developments in economic theory, “they remain the preconditions of
all remotely mainstream economic analysis – always present, sometimes suspended,
sometimes extended”.30 It is this willingness and ability of  economics to stick, “relentlessly
and unflinchingly”, to its story – however incredible – that makes it so broadly appealing.
“Often the truth is that economists don’t know” but “[t]his kind of  modesty is not what
many of  us want to hear. We yearn for comfort and security of  definite answers.”31
But what are the effects of  this analytical and normative disembeddedness, and how
might the community lens help to sharpen our vision of  them? The dominance of
economics is not just irritating for those who would tell other stories in the languages of
other disciplines. It threatens their very survival because, as E F Schumacher observed,
economics is analytically incapable of  accommodating non-economic values and interests.
At best it relegates them to a non-speaking cameo role; at worst, it writes them out of  the
story entirely. One problem is that money has long been the go-to numéraire – measure of
value – for economists, because of  a genuine confidence that everything of  value has a price
and money is the most efficient signal of  those prices. Current efforts to develop
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 62(4)
25 B Fine and D Milonakis, From Economics Imperialism to Freakonomics (London: Routledge 2009).
26 Campbell and Picciotto make this observation in the terminology of  “formalism” as distinct from realism;
D Campbell and S Picciotto, “Exploring the interaction between law and economics: the limits of  formalism”
(1998) 18 Legal Studies 251.
27 Ibid.
28 Krippner et al., “Polanyi Symposium”, n. 14 above, p. 110.
29 G Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press 1976), p. 5.
30 Perry-Kessaris, “Prepare your indicators”, n. 22 above. 
31 Aldred, The Skeptical Economist, n. 11 above, p. 8.
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“happiness” indices and measures of  “well-being” may yet enable us to see inside the black
box of  value, but it is early days.32 It remains the case that:
something is uneconomic when it fails to earn an adequate profit in terms of
money. The method of  economics does not, and cannot, produce any other
meaning . . . Society, or a group or an individual within society, may decide to
hang on to an activity or asset for non-economic reasons – social, aesthetic,
moral, or political – but this does in no way alter its uneconomic character.33
So, anyone who tells the story of  social life (analytically) through an economic lens will
necessarily focus (normatively) on economic values and interests.
The judgment of  economics, in other words, is an extremely fragmentary
judgment; out of  the large number of  aspects which in real life have to be seen
and judged together before a decision can be taken, economics supplies only one
– whether a thing yields a money profit to those who undertake it or not.34
In the language of  community, the “fragmentary” judgment of  economics is worrying
because it is an economic (type) and individualistic (pattern) story in which the speaking
roles are given to those engaged in economic interactions, and the script is composed
entirely of  monologues. So it blinds us to the reality that all actors are engaged in multiple,
diverse and complex patterns of  social action and interaction.
Further concern is raised by the fact that analytical and normative approaches have what
we might call a performative dimension. The analytical and normative disembedding of  the
Industrial Revolution was in part caused and effected by the introduction of  the “fictitious
commodities” of  land, labour and money – fictions that were suggested by economic
theory. When such fictions leak “outside of  academia, they turn into powerful social
constructions that are equipped with scientific authority”. Economic theory simultaneously
“produces” and “performs” the very economic reality that it is supposed to describe.35 The
“descriptions” that we use to “organise” markets for labour, land and money are
“fictitious”, but land, labour and money “are being actually bought and sold on the market;
their demand and supply are real magnitudes”.36 By treating society “as if ” it were a market,
so we create market society. Indeed “market society has ultimately to be understood as an
artefact of  modern (neo-) liberal economics”.37 Some commentators have made this point
by drawing on Michel Foucault’s observations on power and discourse. For example, Arturo
Escobar refers to the market economy as “a way of  organising our perception of  the world
and our actions in it” – not only a “system” of  “production” that places us in “social
relations of  production”, and a system “of  power” that places us “in relations of  power”,
but also a “system of  signification” which places us in “linguistic and discursive relations”.38
We think economics, do economics and feel economic.39
An obvious example of  the performative potential of  the economic approach came in
the form of  the sub-prime mortgage crisis that triggered the 2008 global financial crisis.
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32 See J Bronsteen, C Buccafusco and J Masur, “Welfare as happiness” (2010) 98 Georgetown Law Journal 1583.
33 E F Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: A study of  economics as if  people mattered (London: Vintage Press 1993 
[1973]), p. 28.
34 Ibid. (original emphasis).
35 Frerichs, “Re-embedding neo-liberal constitutionalism”, n. 8 above, p. 78.
36 Polanyi, The Great Transformation, n. 9 above, p. 76.
37 Frerichs, “Re-embedding neo-liberal constitutionalism”, n. 8 above, p. 78.
38 A Escobar, Encountering Development: The making and unmaking of  the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP
1995), p. 142.
39 The implications for counter-movement have drawn out by David Schneiderman, for example, in his
presentation at the 2010 Law and Society Association annual meeting in Chicago.
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“Buyers” and “sellers” of  financial products were encouraged to follow (their perceptions
of) a heady combination of  their own preferences for risk, and the quality and prices of
products on offer. On Main Street and on the High Street, deals were done between
commission-hungry mortgage brokers and aspiring homeowners with no income and no
assets. On Wall Street and in the City, those mortgages were sold on to investors desperate
for somewhere to park their cash with benefits. A regulatory gloss was provided by financial
authorities and private sector credit-rating agencies, which intervened with the half-hearted,
narrow and shallow self-consciousness of  interlopers.40 Everyone was on the same market-
oriented page, even if  not everyone was qualified to understand what was written on it.41
There is always the chance that economists, their marionettes and their collaborators will
spontaneously come to, drop their scripts and exit stage left – a possibility that was hinted
at when the scales of  disembeddedness fell from the neoliberal eyes of  former chairman of
the United States Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan. The following exchange between
Greenspan and Representative Henry Waxman during the 2008 hearings at the United
States Congress on the financial crisis has been identified as especially enlightening:42
Rep. Henry Waxman: “I do have an ideology. My judgment is that free,
competitive markets are by far the unrivalled way to organise economies. We’ve
tried regulation. None meaningfully worked.” That was your quote. You had the
authority to prevent irresponsible lending practices that led to the subprime
mortgage crisis. You were advised to do so by many others. And now our whole
economy is paying its price. Do you feel that your ideology pushed you to make
decisions that you wish you had not made?
Alan Greenspan: Well, remember that what an ideology is, is a conceptual
framework with the way people deal with reality. Everyone has one. You have to
– to exist, you need an ideology. The question is whether it is accurate or not.
And what I’m saying to you is, yes, I found a flaw. I don’t know how significant
or permanent it is, but I’ve been very distressed by that fact.
Rep. Henry Waxman: You found a flaw in the reality . . .
Alan Greenspan: Flaw in the model that I perceived is the critical functioning
structure that defines how the world works, so to speak.
Rep. Henry Waxman: In other words, you found that your view of  the world,
your ideology, was not right, it was not working?
Alan Greenspan: . . . No, that’s precisely the reason I was shocked, because I
had been going for 40 years or more with very considerable evidence that it was
working exceptionally well.
As Raj Patel explains, the “flaw” to which Greenspan referred was neither the “minor
problem of  shoddy data” scuppering a good model, to which many post-crisis
commentators have pointed; nor “the bigger Black Swan problem” of  the weak financial
models failing to take account of  low frequency–high impact events, to which Nassim
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40 A jargon-free and comprehensive account of  the financial crisis and its fall-out is provided in two podcasts
(both with full transcripts) from the National Public Radio production company This American Life entitled
“The Giant Pool of  Money” and “The Watchmen”. Countless issues arising from the crisis have been covered
in the same style by another National Public Radio production company, Planet Money.
41 R Dyal Chand, “What would de Soto say about the subprime meltdown?” in D B Barros (ed.), Hernando de
Soto in a Market Economy (Aldershot: Ashgate 2010); and Exporting the Ownership Society: A case study on the economic
impact of  property rights, Northeastern University School of  Law, March 2007, Research Paper No 15-2007,
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=968689 (last accessed 24 January 2011).
42 R Patel, The Value of  Nothing (London: Portobello Books 2011), p. 6.
Taleb42a presciently drew our attention in 2007. The “flaw” in Greenspan’s model was
utterly “fundamental”: it was based on a “warped . . .  view about how the world was
organised, about the sociology of  the market”.43 Greenspan’s “warped view” came from
looking at society through the analytical and normative lens of  mainstream economics.
So, although we have not, in fact, been produced solely for sale, we can come to behave
as if, even believe that we were – mistaking the play for reality, the script and costumes for
our own. Because “markets leave their mark”,44 we come increasingly to “know the price
of  everything and the value of  nothing” – as author Raj Patel, UNISON’s head of  local
government in Wales and Friends of  the Earth have all recently paraphrased Oscar Wilde.45
We may thus become less willing and/or able to perpetrate Polanyi’s counter-movements.
Wherever the balance lies between, on the one hand, the redemptive capacities of  the likes
of  Greenspan and, on the other hand, the susceptibility of  all humans to market disciplines,
law offers hope for those who would counter-move. However, as the next section explains,
the news is not all good. For law is an extension of  social life, and thus is itself  subject to
the disembedding forces of  economics and the perils of  human frailty. 
Law in action and interaction
What can a community lens reveal about the role of  law in always embedded action and
interaction? The law-and-community re-telling of  the embeddedness story begins with a
simple restatement of  the micro–meso level social-embeddedness theme in a legal context:
any actor, including their actions and interactions and their associated law, is simultaneously
embedded, to different degrees, in multiple types of  social life and their associated law.46 Law,
like economy, is a part of  social life. 
What is of  interest to socio-legal enquiry is ‘how a certain side or part of  the
social takes the form of  law’ – or, indeed, does not take the form of  law; or only
partially takes the form of  law; or appears to but does not, in fact, take the form
of  law.47
Law, whether generated by state or non-state actors, is used, abused and avoided at every
level of  social life. 
A community lens highlights a distinction between two of  law’s many faces:48 one which
is directed towards supporting the ad hoc actions and interactions of  individuals; and
another which is directed towards supporting those relatively stable and trusting interactions
that are “networks of  community”. Law supports individuals by facilitating their efforts to
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protect and promote their values and interests. This is the face of  law of  which
contemporary, mainstream, individualistic, market-oriented economics is primarily
enamoured. There is no doubt that these are real and legitimate roles for law, but “[l]aw’s
aspiration is towards something more than . . . the society of  morally unconnected, rights-
possessing individuals that liberal philosophy tends to presuppose”.49 Law can also act as a
communal resource in support of  networks of  community engaged in all types of  social
action (instrumental, including economic, traditional, affective and belief-based).
Law supports community, by expressing the trust that binds actors together in stable,
productive relations. Contracts, constitutions and articles of  association are all good
examples. Law supports community by securing spaces for the coordination of  the diverse
values and interests of  multiple networks of  community, thereby ensuring that those diverse
stable, productive trusting relations persist and flourish. “An emphasis on community does
not imply an absence of  conflict.” It actually “highlights key foci of  legal contradiction and
controversy”.50 Law supports community, by encouraging widespread participation in social
life within and between networks of  community. It does this generally by protecting the
security and autonomy of  individuals, and specifically by creating and maintaining gateways
through which participation can occur. In so doing it supports mutual interpersonal trust,
which both consolidates existing community-like relations and opens the door to the
development of  new community-like relations. Public interest litigation, environmental
impact assessments and public hearings are all good examples of  legal mechanisms which
facilitate participation and coordination.51
It is primarily in law’s capacity to act as a communal resource that the hope of  those
who would counter-move resides. The values and interests that underpin actions and
interactions (individualistic or communal) in one type of  social action or interactions
(instrumental, affective, belief, or traditional) may be in direct conflict with the values and
interests underpinning other actions and interactions. Such conflicts are the beating heart
and meaningful soul of  embeddedness, and they can be made more productive, or less
destructive, when law acts as communal resource.
Law in regime and rationality
Polanyi’s vision of  law is as a facilitator and collaborator of  social transformation. When he
proposed that nineteenth-century society was “transformed” in a “double movement”, he
implied a triple role for law: embedded, disembedding, re-embedding. First, law played an
innocent, embedded role when it facilitated the “extension of  the market organisation in
respect to genuine commodities” such as milk, oil and cotton. On the other hand, law
played a grubby role as collaborator during the disembedding movement in which the
fictitious commodities were created: the “as-if ” commodities of  labour, land and money
were necessarily legal, as well as economic, fictions.52
[A]ny measures or policies that would inhibit the formation of  [land, labour or
money] markets would ipso facto endanger the self-regulation of  the system. The
commodity fiction, therefore, supplies a vital organising principle in regard to the
whole of  society affecting almost all its institutions in the most varied way,
namely, the principle according to which no arrangement of  behaviour should be
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allowed to exist that might prevent the actual functions of  the market mechanism
on the lines of  the commodity fiction.53
At the same time, law played a third, heroic role, this time in the counter-movement to
re-embed economy: the “restriction” of  market organisation “in respect to fictitious
[commodities]”.54 Economists pretend that the economy is an autonomous “self-
regulating” set of  relationships. Lawyers collaborate by dressing humans and nature as
“fictitious commodities”, Labour and Land, and present them as having been produced for
the sole purpose of  being sold. But off-stage lurks reality, in which the action and
interaction remain embedded in society, and society always “protect[s] itself  against the
perils inherent in a self-regulating market system”.55 As “markets spread” deeper and wider,
so a “network of  measures and policies was integrated into powerful institutions designed
to check the action of  the market relative to labour, land and money”, and a “deep-seated
movement sprang into being to resist the pernicious effects of  a market-controlled
economy”.56 Law’s capacity to act as a communal resource can be read directly into
Polanyi’s account: it expressed the acceptable extensions of  markets in respect of  genuine
commodities within economic networks of  community; and maintained spaces for the co-
ordination of  inter-network values and interests in which the counter-moving restricting,
checking and resisting of  markets duly took place. 
What Polanyi did not directly address was the transformation – the disembedding – of
law itself. As we have seen, law is “always embedded” in social action and interaction.
Equally, regimes and rationalities have legal dimensions, so law is implicated when regimes
and rationalities become disembedded and re-embedded in the wider social sphere – as
different analytical and normative approaches ascend and descend the “ranking” of
“principles of  social organisation”.
A critical Polanyian perspective has thus, first, to de-construct the Hayekian way
of  embedding even the law (and its inherent normativity) in economic
rationalities, and, secondly, to reconstruct law as a social institution which also
reflects the rationalities and values of  other social spheres.57
This is a task to which a community lens is ideally suited, for it enables us to both “seek
similarity”, to pay attention to the common threads that run through all social, including
economic, relations; and to “appreciate difference” in the often conflicting values, interests
and legal needs that are central to each of  these relations.58 A community lens suggests that
the legal embeddedness storyline can be extended at the meta level of  rationalities in at least
two ways, both of  which I have explored elsewhere, albeit in slightly different guises, so I
will limit myself  to a few edited highlights. 
First, the thread of  analytical and normative disembeddedness can be extended to the
legal context: approaches to social life and their associated law may come to float free from
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their proper bed in the wider social sciences. Here, I am thinking of  ever-more
commonplace economic approaches (analytical and normative) to law. Analytically,
economic concepts and relationships are used to describe law both as a (fictitious)
commodity in its own right, and as a facilitator and regulator of  markets for other (fictitious
and real) commodities. A very real example of  this is to be found in the World Bank’s
current predilection for treating national legal systems “as if ” they are an input into a larger
fictitious commodity know as an “investment climate”, with which states are presented as
touting for the attentions of  foreign investors. The “commodity” of  the national legal
system is doubly significant in investment climate discourse because it also facilities and
regulates markets for other fictitious commodities such as labour and environmental
resources, as well as real commodities. The normative dimension of  the rise of  the
economic approach to law is that economic values and interests are used to judge the merits
or desirability of  various legal phenomena. A market-oriented approach to law, economy
and society sees only economic values and interests, and it insists that those values and
interests are valuable, and ought to be interesting, to individuals and networks that are
focused on non-economic types of  social life. Turning once more to the World Bank, in its
investment climate discourse a “good” legal system is one that is efficient, which means
quick and cheap. So the bank measures the speed and cost of  legal systems and ranks them
accordingly in a league table.59
Second, we can extend the thread of  performativity to the legal context by asking: have
we come to know the price of  law but lost touch with its value? Here, I am thinking of  the
commodification of  legal systems in the context of  investment climate discourse. By
treating legal systems “as if ” they are merely an input into a larger commodity known as
“investment climate”, so we can create that reality. For example, states battle to move up the
World Bank’s economically defined league table, if  necessary, sacrificing the legal needs of
other types of  social life (non-economic instrumental, traditional, belief  and affective
social). A detailed case study of  the impact of  investment climate discourse in Indian
foreign investor–government–civil society relations showed not only that investment
climate discourse was diverting attention from the interests and values that underpin non-
economic relations; it was actively undermining the ability of  law to support those non-
economic relations,60 and any counter-movements that those relations might have
produced. The effects of  such a loss can be, as Polanyi pointed out, catastrophic. Without
the protection offered by the regulatory counter-movement, “Nature would be reduced to
its elements, neighbourhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted . . . the power to
produce food and raw materials destroyed.”61
Conclusion
Law, economy and society have starred in countless tales of  derring-do. It is not
uncommon, but it is pointless, to reword a perfectly good story without revealing
anything in the process. So, what is gained from the effort of  translating the socio-econo-
legal tangle first into the language of  Polanyi’s embeddedness, and then into that of
Cotterrell’s community?
One of  the most important benefits of  thinking in Polanyian terms is a sense of
historical context and perspective – an essential counterpoint to the prevailing tendency to
privilege “being in the moment” and to scavenge ceaselessly for record-breakers. The Great
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Transformation is a story written by an economic historian, in the mid-twentieth century,
about the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as compared to the fifteenth century and
beyond. It puts us in our place and helps us to get over ourselves.
Another benefit of  speaking Polanyian is that it enables us to build on the gains of  those
who have gone before us and diverts us from reinventing analytical wheels. The “concept
of  an always embedded economy” has already been shown to be an effective transformer
of  rationalities because it makes it “very hard to gloss over or hide the state’s fundamental
role in shaping actually existing economies”; because it reveals that there are “no inherent
obstacles to restructuring market societies along more democratic and egalitarian lines”; and
because it reminds us that “economic actors have to be constructed” – that is, “to learn how
to behave in market situations” and in the context of  the very different “complexes of
ideas” that prevail across what are varied market societies.62 But those transformative
messages have less often been translated to the level of  regimes, that is, in “public policy –
particularly as reflected in the Washington consensus doctrines concerning how the
developing world and the economies in transition should make their great
transformations”.63 So, important untapped authors, tellers and audiences of  the story of
embeddedness remain. 
The already profoundly significant story of  The Great Transformation is enriched by the
application of  the lens of  community. It allows us to think clearly about the facts that
economic action and interaction are always embedded in the sense that any actor is at once
engaged, to different degrees (from fleeting to stable), in multiple types (whether focusing
on instrumental, traditional, affective and/or belief-based action) of  social life; and that
economy may become disembedded from wider social life in the sense that the analytical
and normative approaches that are central to economic actions and interactions may be
confused with, and privileged over, those that are central to non-economic actions and
interactions. It also allows us to specify the role of  law within and between all these patterns
and types of  social life, as a facilitator of  both disembedding movements and re-embedding
counter-movements, and as itself  subject to disembedding. 
Most importantly, because the law-and-community approach pays particular attention to
the presence and absence of  interpersonal trust, it has a distinctly human orientation. So we
are reminded that the capacity of  law, individual or communal, state or non-state, is always
subject to the talents, ingenuity, whims and frailties of  its human (ab)users and avoiders,
whether state or non-state actors, movers or counter-movers.64 We are also provided with
a common vocabulary for tales of  hope and of  desperation, which can then be told and
retold in the same circles, checking extremism of  all forms, casting naivety and cynicism to
the cutting-room floor in equal measure. All of  this is possible through a community lens
because it is set to a delicate frequency: “seeking similarity, appreciating difference”.65
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